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Architecture Views

Purpose

This page provides visual representations of the Scheol Security Lab architecture.

It complements:

  • Trust Boundaries & Segmentation (logical model)
  • Security Design Decisions (architectural reasoning)

The objective is to:

  • make the architecture quickly understandable
  • highlight key exposure points and flows
  • support discussion, review and analysis

1. High-Level Architecture Overview

Internet

┌───────────┴───────────┐
│ │
[ VPS-01 ] [ VPS-02 ]
(Web / Gitea / RP) (Dolibarr + DB)
│ │
└───────────┬───────────┘

Public Exposure Layer
(Heaven)

─────────────────────────────

Internal Infrastructure
(Hell)

┌──────────────┴──────────────┐
│ │
│ [ Hypervisor ] │
│ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ [ Firewall ] │ │
│ └──────────────┘ │
│ │
└─────── Internal Network ────┘

Notes

  • Public services are currently co-located on VPS infrastructure
  • Internal systems are not exposed but still under construction
  • Separation exists but is not fully enforced

2. Trust Zones Visualization

[ Internet ]


┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ Public Exposure Zone (Heaven)│
│ (VPS-01 / VPS-02) │
└──────────────┬───────────────┘


┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ Application & Data Zone │
│ (Dolibarr / DB - partial) │
└──────────────┬───────────────┘


┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ Internal Core (Hell) │
│ (Firewall / Hypervisor) │
└──────────────┬───────────────┘

┌─────────┴─────────┐
▼ ▼
┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ Admin Zone │ │ Security Zone│
│ (Planned) │ │ (Planned) │
└──────────────┘ └──────────────┘

Notes

  • Zones are logically defined
  • Enforcement is partial
  • Admin and Security zones are not yet fully implemented

3. Critical Flows

3.1 Public Access Flow

User → Internet → VPS → Reverse Proxy → Application

  • Main attack surface
  • Depends heavily on reverse proxy configuration
  • Linked to R-001

3.2 Application → Data Flow

Application (Dolibarr) → MariaDB

  • Sensitive data handling
  • Limited isolation in current state
  • Linked to R-002

3.3 Administrative Access Flow (Current)

Admin Workstation → SSH → VPS / Systems

  • Direct access still possible
  • No bastion enforced
  • Linked to R-003

3.4 Administrative Access Flow (Target)

Admin Workstation → Bastion → Target Systems

  • Centralized access control
  • Improved traceability
  • Not yet implemented

3.5 Logging Flow (Planned)

VPS / Systems → Log Forwarding → SIEM (Hell)

  • Currently absent or local only
  • Critical for detection capability

3.6 Backup Flow (Planned)

Systems → Backup Platform → External Storage

  • Currently weak / incomplete
  • High priority for resilience

4. Exposure & Risk Hotspots

[ VPS-01 ]
- Co-location (Web + Gitea)
- Reverse proxy dependency

[ VPS-02 ]
- Business data concentration
- Application + DB coupling

[ Admin Access ]
- No bastion
- Direct SSH access

[ Logging ]
- No central visibility

5. Architecture Evolution (Simplified View)

CURRENT STATE
-------------
- Co-located services (VPS)
- Direct admin access
- Local logging
- Partial segmentation


TARGET STATE
------------
- Service separation (multi-instance)
- Bastion-based admin access
- Centralized logging (SIEM)
- Enforced segmentation

Usage

This page is intended to:

  • support quick architectural understanding
  • visualize risk exposure areas
  • assist in discussions (review, interview, audit)
  • complement detailed documentation

It is intentionally simplified and visual, and should remain aligned with the actual state of the lab.