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Identity & Access Logic

Purpose​

This page describes how identities, authentication, and access control are structured within the Scheol Security Lab.

The objective is to:

  • define how access to systems is controlled
  • highlight trust levels associated with identities
  • document current limitations and target improvements

This section reflects a transitional model, evolving toward a more centralized and controlled identity architecture.


Identity Model​

Current State​

Identity management is currently decentralized and partially controlled, with several known limitations affecting consistency and traceability.

  • Separate identities are used for different services
  • Strong passwords are enforced
  • A dedicated credential storage solution is used, but without centralized policy enforcement or audit capabilities
  • MFA is not yet consistently enforced

Key Characteristics​

  • No centralized identity provider yet
  • Limited identity federation between systems
  • Identity lifecycle (creation, modification, revocation) is manual

Risks​

  • Inconsistent authentication policies
  • Credential sprawl across services
  • Limited visibility over access and usage
  • Direct administrative access paths without centralized control
  • Absence of MFA on critical access points
  • Limited traceability of privileged actions

Target Model​

The target state aims for a centralized identity architecture:

  • Central identity provider (LDAP / AD)
  • Systematic MFA enforcement for sensitive access
  • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
  • Clear separation between administrative and standard identities

Access Control Principles​

Least Privilege​

Access rights are limited to what is strictly necessary for each role.

Separation of Duties​

Roles are logically separated:

  • Sec - governance, risk, monitoring
  • Ops - infrastructure management
  • Dev - automation and deployment

Controlled Entry Points​

Sensitive access must be:

  • centralized
  • authenticated
  • traceable

Administrative Access Model​

Current State​

  • Administrative access is performed from a personal workstation
  • Direct administrative access to systems is currently possible without centralized enforcement, representing a significant security gap
  • No enforced bastion

Risks​

  • Weak isolation between personal and administrative environments
  • Increased exposure of credentials
  • Lack of centralized access logging

Target Model​

Administrative access will follow a controlled path:

Admin Workstation → Bastion → Target Systems

Target Security Controls​

  • SSH key-based authentication
  • Mandatory MFA
  • Session logging and auditability
  • Restricted access paths

Secrets Management​

Current State​

  • Credentials are stored in a secure vault
  • Unique credentials are used per service
  • Management is manual
  • No centralized visibility over secret usage
  • No formal audit trail

Risks​

  • No formal rotation policy
  • Inconsistent secret usage practices
  • Limited auditability

Target Model​

  • Centralized secrets management
  • Automated rotation where possible
  • Strict access control on sensitive credentials
  • Integration with automation workflows

Trust Levels​

Identity types are associated with different trust levels:

Identity TypeTrust Level
Public usersLow
Service accountsMedium
Standard usersMedium
Administrative accountsHigh
Security / privileged rolesVery High

Access control mechanisms must align with these levels.


Identity & Risk Alignment​

Identity and access management are central to multiple risk scenarios:

  • unauthorized access to systems
  • credential compromise
  • privilege escalation
  • lateral movement across infrastructure

These risks are explicitly modeled through selected threat scenarios and corresponding risk entries in the Governance & Risk section.

Access control decisions must therefore be directly linked to:

  • risk scenarios
  • control definitions
  • validation mechanisms

Evolution​

Identity and access management is one of the main improvement areas in the lab.

Planned evolutions include:

  • deployment of centralized identity services
  • consistent MFA enforcement
  • bastion-based administrative access
  • improved access traceability and auditing

Current Maturity​

At the current stage, identity and access management is considered partially established.

Established​

  • use of unique identities per service
  • secure credential storage practices
  • basic access control discipline
  • initial separation of roles (Sec / Ops / Dev)

In Progress​

  • consistent MFA deployment across sensitive systems
  • definition of centralized identity architecture
  • improved separation between personal and administrative environments
  • formalization of access control policies

Planned / Next Phase​

  • deployment of centralized identity provider (LDAP / AD)
  • enforcement of bastion-based administrative access
  • implementation of RBAC across systems
  • improved traceability and audit of access activities

This section reflects a transitional state and will evolve as identity controls are strengthened.